Supply chain attack: targeting the supplier link
A supply chain attack compromises a supplier, service provider, or software dependency rather than the final target directly, in order to reach it indirectly and often through less monitored paths.
Definition
By embedding malicious code in a widely used software library, or by compromising the systems of a service provider with legitimate access to its clients, an attacker can reach a very large number of victims from a single initial point of compromise.
This type of attack bypasses some traditional defenses because the entry vector benefits from assumed trust: signed software or a regular supplier. This is why vigilance must extend beyond the organization's own perimeter to include its dependencies and service providers.
Key points
A diverted link
The attacker compromises a trusted supplier or dependency rather than the final target directly.
A multiplied impact
A single point of compromise can affect all clients or users of the targeted supplier.
Broader vigilance is required
An organization's security also depends on the security of its suppliers and software dependencies.
How BCIT can support you
Assessing your critical service providers and dependencies is part of a GRC and our security audits with an extended scope.
Frequently asked questions ❓
How can I assess the risk linked to my suppliers?
Mapping your critical service providers and their access rights, integrated into a GRC approach, is the essential starting point.
Can signed software still be compromised?
Yes: a supply chain attack can insert malicious code upstream, before the final software is even signed.
Not ready to talk yet? Discover our cybersecurity assessment →
Do you know the risks carried by your suppliers?
Let us extend the risk analysis beyond your internal perimeter alone.
Supply chain attack: targeting the supplier link
A supply chain attack compromises a supplier, service provider, or software dependency rather than the final target directly, in order to reach it indirectly and often through less monitored paths.
Definition
By embedding malicious code in a widely used software library, or by compromising the systems of a service provider with legitimate access to its clients, an attacker can reach a very large number of victims from a single initial point of compromise.
This type of attack bypasses some traditional defenses because the entry vector benefits from assumed trust: signed software or a regular supplier. This is why vigilance must extend beyond the organization's own perimeter to include its dependencies and service providers.
Key points
A diverted link
The attacker compromises a trusted supplier or dependency rather than the final target directly.
A multiplied impact
A single point of compromise can affect all clients or users of the targeted supplier.
Broader vigilance is required
An organization's security also depends on the security of its suppliers and software dependencies.
How BCIT can support you
Assessing your critical service providers and dependencies is part of a GRC and our security audits with an extended scope.
Frequently asked questions ❓
How can I assess the risk linked to my suppliers?
Mapping your critical service providers and their access rights, integrated into a GRC approach, is the essential starting point.
Can signed software still be compromised?
Yes: a supply chain attack can insert malicious code upstream, before the final software is even signed.
Not ready to talk yet? Discover our cybersecurity assessment →
Do you know the risks carried by your suppliers?
Let us extend the risk analysis beyond your internal perimeter alone.